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EQUITY
By CHARLES

J. HILKEY* and ROBERT H. HALL**

Although the cases decided in Equity during the survey period suggest
little that is new, yet some of them contain excellent restatements of the
principles and doctrines of chancery and in some instances their application to new and interesting factual situations. In a few cases new rules were
formulated. Some attempt will be made to connect the conclusions reached
in these cases with those found in older cases in Georgia and, in certain instances, with those reached in other jurisdictions.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE

Certainty of Terms.-We are met at the outset with the requirement that
in order to secure specific performance a contract "must be clear, distinct,
and definite in all its terms." This is one of the cardinal principles of the
court of equity where its power to specifically perform a 'contract is invoked,
and this is not only the law of Georgia but is the test applied generally.'
Since the price or consideration in the sale of real property is one of the
necessary terms of the contract, this term or element must be clearly
stated or expressed, but if a means is provided in the contract whereby a
term or, in this case, the price or consideration may be definitely arrived
at, the contract is sufficiently certain in this respect.
In the case of Carroll v. Jones' the plaintiffs brought suit for specific
performance of a written lease and an option to purchase the leased
premises for a price not to exceed $8,5oO to be determined by an appraisal
of representatives of the city real estate board. The vendor, plaintiff in
error, contended that the contract was indefinite and uncertain. The court
held that although a contract must be definite and certain, the present contract contained a definite method whereby the terms could be fixed and
the disputed element, the price, had been determined by the designated
appraisers. Here, the price had been made certain by the determination
of representatives of the city real estate board. The petition alleged that
an appraisal had been made and a tender of that amount. Had the vendor
repudiated the contract before appraisal, the court of equity, by the general law, would not have taken jurisdiction, for equity would not have
the power to specifically enforce appraisal.:' But many courts have made
a distinction between arbitration and appraisal, even covering the price
or value of property sold. This distinction is maintained in Georgia and,
*Visiting Professor of Law, University of Georgia; Dean Emeritus, Lamar School
of Law, Emory University; A.B., 1905, College of Emporia; A.M., 1907, University
of Kansas; Ph.D., 1910, Columbia University; J.D., 1915, University of Michigan
Law School; S.J.D., 1924, Harvard University Law School; Member American and
Georgia Bar Associations.
**Assistant Professor of Law, Lamar School of Law, Emory University; B.S., 1941,
University of Georgia; LL.B., 1948, University of Virginia; Member American and
Georgia Bar Associations.
1. 49 AM. JUR. 34, § 22.
2. 206 Ga. 332, 57 S.E.2d 173 (1950).
3. STURGES, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATIONS § 7.
( 68)
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after the appointment or designation of appraisers as in the instant case,
it would be too late to revoke their authority.'
Tender.-In order to qualify for specific performance, the purchaser
must tender the amount due the vendor where the sale is for cash, 5 and
this includes interest to the time of tender; but interest does not run until,
according to the agreement, the purchase money is due. '
Consideration.-As in law, equity requires, generally, a consideration
before a contract will be specifically enforced. But equity will specifically
enforce "a voluntary agreement or merely gratuitous promise" where
possession of land has been given and "valuable improvements made" in
reliance upon "such agreement" if there is "a meritorious consideration. '
The meaning of "meritorious consideration" came up in Mankin v. Bryant,'
In this case the stockholders had agreed to partition the real property
(lakeshore sites) held by the corporation and the corporation had approved of the agreement. The plaintiff, on the strength of this agreement,
went into possession of the portion given him and made valuable improvements. Upon the question of consideration the court suggested that the
facts showed a valuable consideration, but concluded that in this case a
valuable conisderation was not necessary. "We hold," said the court, "that,
under all these facts, a 'meritorious consideration' is shown for the
promise." Thus, meritorious consideration, though shown by blood relationship and even by affinity, is not so limited. Evidence of meritorious
consideration arises out of circumstances that may have "contributed to
form in the donor a motive to the gift, or in the donee some meritorious
claim upon the donor's bounty. '
Perhaps the decision would have been placed on firmer ground had the
court confined meritorious consideration to the area of "good consideration." By Code Section 20-303, it is provided that a "good consideration"
is sufficient to support a contract. "Good consideration" is predicated
upon "love and affection toward a near relative by consanguinity or affinity
or one to whom a moral duty exists, or be based on a strong moral obligation arising from some antecedent legal 1 obligation, although then unenforceable, or from some present equity."'
4. Parsons v. Ambos, 121 Ga. 98, 48 S.E. 696 (1904).
5. This requirement is based on the maxim contained in Code Section 37-104. The general law is otherwise, since the court of equity can adjust the equities between the
parties by the terms of the decree. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY 207 (2d ed. 1948). But the

6.

7.
8.
9.
10.

tender, as in the principal case, may be waived, among other things, where the
purchaser repudiates the contract. And the tender, unless waived, must be alleged
in the petition. Williams v. Fouche, 157 Ga. 227, 121 S.E. 217 (1924). The principle
contained in Code Section 37-104 would include specific performance as contained in
Code Section 20-906.
Shepard v. Gettys, 206 Ga. 392, 57 S.E.2d 272 (1950). The general rule as to interest is the same as the Georgia rule. Interest runs from the time payment is due
in a cash sale, even though the purchaser had previously been let into possession.
MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 111 (2d ed. 1948) ; Note, 75 A.L.R. 316; Note, 15 COL. L.
REV. 256 (1915).
GA. CODE§ 37-804 (1933).
206 Ga. 120, 56 S.E.2d 447 (1949).
Poster v. Allen, 54 Ga. 623 (3) (1875).
Cannon v. Williams, 194 Ga. 808 (2), 22 S.E.2d 838 (1942). See also Trustees of
Williams Hospital v. Nesbit, 189 Ga. 807 (2), 7 S.E.2d 737 (1940). At the common
law a covenant to stand seized was supported by a good consideration which was
defined as the love and affection for a relative by blood or affinity. 4 TIFFANY, REAL

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

Option.-The nature of an option contract for the sale of realty came
up in Jones v. Smith." The heirs of the optionor sued the administrator
and the assignee of the optionee to cancel an option and enjoin the conveyance of the realty by the administrator. The assignee in his answer
prayed for specific performance, and the lower court directed a verdict
for the defendants and in favor of the assignee for specific performance.
The Supreme Court reversed the holding of the trial court on the ground
that in view o'f the conflicting evidence the issues should have been left
to the jury. However, the court reiterated certain rules as to option contracts and specific performance. In Georgia, the extension of an option
must be in writing and must be based on additional consideration which is
sufficient if the agreement contains the recital of the payment of one2 dollar,
although in fact not paid, for it creates the obligation of payment.
In the instant case, it is stated that the option was in writing. Although
it is a disputed point generally, 3 the view in Georgia is that an option for
the purchase of realty falls within the statute of frauds and must be in
writing; 4 and, of course, the extension of time in which the option must
be exercised must likewise be in writing for it is in reality a new contract.
Such extension agreement must contain an adequate consideration. 5 Furthermore, the instant case distinguished between the inadequacy of consideration in Georgia as a ground for the cancellation of a contract and
as a ground for refusing specific performance. 6
Contract to Devise Real Property.-In a suit for possession of an undivided interest brought by an administrator, the defendant alleged, in a
cross-action, an oral promise by the deceased to devise the realty to her
in consideration of services rendered in caring for the deceased during her
lifetime, and sought specific performance of such promise to the extent of
the deceased's interest in the realty and compensation in damages for the
outstanding interest. The defendant was a niece of the deceased. The
agreement was oral. The trial court sustained the plaintiff's motion to
strike the answer and cross-action. This holding was reversed on appeal. 7
The court pointed out that it has long been held in America that contracts to devise property either real or personal for a valuable consideration will be enforced. In Georgia an oral contract to devise specific property as compensation for services rendered and to be rendered during the
life of the promisor is valid and enforceable."8 Nor in case of services be§ 957 (3rd ed. 1939). In Georgia, love and affection of father for son is
sufficient. Milton v. Milton, 192 Ga. 778, 16 S.E.2d 573 (1941). Family relationship
by affinity need not be direct. Payne v. Thebaut, 180 Ga. 738 (4), 180 S.E. 725
(1935).
206 Ga. 162, 56 S.E.2d 462 (1949).
However, by the general law, although the adequacy of consideration is not material
in an option since one dollar is sufficient, 55 AM. JUR. 504, § 34, yet consideration
cannot be waived and, although receipt is recited in the option, this is not sufficient
if no consideration is intended to be given. Op. cit. supra § 32, nn. 16-18.
49 AM. JUR. 503, § 167.
Meely v. Sheppard, 185 Ga. 771, 196 S.E. 452 (1938).
This is also the general rule. 55 AM. JUR. 509, § 40.
Citing Code Sections 96-105 and 37-805.
Bowles v. White, 206 Ga. 433, 57 S.E.2d 547 (1950).
The court cited Gordon v. Spellman, 145 Ga. 682, 89 S.E. 749 (1916), and Belt v.
Lazenby, 126 Ga. 767, 56 S.E. 81 (1906). With respect to an oral contract to devise
real property in consideration for services, the general law is in accord with the
PROPERTY
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18.
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tween relatives where there is involved care and attention is it necessary
to allege the value of the services and the value of the property to be devised. Here too, the defendant, since a part of the property promised to
be devised cannot be conveyed, is entitled to damages as in other contracts
to convey property. The court further said that the defendant had a right
which would be a good defense against an action of ejectment since she held
possession under a perfect equity resulting from full performance of her
contract."
Possession under Oral Contract.-In order to take an oral contract
for the sale of land out of the statute of frauds by possession and improve.
ments, possession must be given by the owner. The interest of the holder
of a security deed is not sufficient, even though such holder represents
that he will foreclose the deed and purchase the property. Taking pos.
session under such circumstances would constitute a trespass and not a
valid possession."
Time Not of the Essence, Generally.-In a contract for the sale of lane
where no specific provision is made, nor circumstances present to con.
stitute time of the essence, time is not of the essence and delay in tender
of performance must be unreasonable to constitute a defense to specific per.
formance. Where such land contract exists and there is no unreasonablc
delay in tender of performance, the purchasers from the vendors, with
notice either constructive or actual or both, are bound by the contract
Tender of performance must be made to the purchasers unless waived
in the instant case waiver was shown by the refusal of the purchasers tc
perform the contract. 2
NEGATIVE COVENANTS

Use of Land.-In the sale of real property which had been and wa,
then used for tourist courts, the vendors covenanted orally that the3
would not use the remaining property owned by them which was adjaceni
to the portion sold for the purpose of running a tourist court. The deec
did not contain either a recital or reference to this covenant. The pur
chasers sought to enjoin the defendant vendors from engaging in thc
tourist cabin business on the adjoining land covered by the covenant. A
general demurrer was sustained in the trial court, but this judgment wa!
overruled on appeal. The court held that the oral agreement fell neithel
within the parol evidence rule nor the statute of frauds. Since the agree
ment to purchase was fully executed, the transaction was taken out of th(
statute of frauds by Code Section 20-402 (2), and it is not material thai
such covenant was not to be performed within a year.22

19.
20.
21.
22.

Georgia law where the services are of a peculiar kind, as where the deceased wa,
ill or infirm or where the promisee was related to the deceased. Notes, 69 A.L.R
145 et seq.; Note, 106 A.L.R. 760; 49 AM, JUR. 821, §§ 524 et seq.
Perfect equity. PowELL, ACTIONS FOR LAND § 138 (Rev. ed. 1946).
Monroe v. Goldberg, 80 Ga. App. 770, 57 S.E.2d 449 (1950). See 49 AM. JUR. 744
§ 439, nn. 12 and 13.
Finney v. Blalock, 206 Ga. 655, 58 S.E.2d 429 (1950).
Kutash v. Gluckman, 193 Ga. 805 (3), 20 S.E.2d 128 (1942). But for the abov(
mentioned exception in the code, it would be a disputed point whether or not
covenant governing the use of land falls within the statute of frauds. 49 AM. JUR
497, § 158. And if the covenant relates to land, the one-year limitation does no
apply. 49 A4m. JuR. 405, § 48.
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Business or Profession.-The case of Burdine v. Brooks23 deserves
special consideration. Defendant's brother (the defendant and his brother
being practicing physicians and surgeons) sold the plaintiff a hospital and
the good will established by the defendant and his brother, the vendor.
At the time the conveyance was executed, the defendant, although he did
not own the hospital, agreed that the good will and practice of the hospital were conveyed and transferred to the plaintiff, and covenanted that
he would not establish or maintain a clinic or office in the county in which
the hospital was located for a period of ten years, except that he might
practice by house-to-house calls made from his office in an adjoining
county. Defendant having opened an office and clinic in the county in which
the hospital was located, the plaintiff brought suit for an injunction. On
appeal, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court overruling the
defendant's demurrer and granting a temporary injunction. The court
held that the contract was reasonable as to time and space. As pointed out
by the court, there is a distinction between covenants not to compete as
relating to business, and as relating to a profession. Both must be reasonable as to space, but the former need not be limited as to time, while the
latter must be so limited."4 The question of whether a partial restraint of
trade is reasonable is a question of law for the court.25 Furthermore, the
court did not deem that the scarcity of doctors in the county would render
the covenant unreasonable. As to the contention that such contracts were
invalid under the Constitution of 1945, the court said that it had been
otherwise decided.2
The court in the instant case goes a long distance in supporting covenants
not to compete. The defendant did not own the hospital, nor did he sell
his practice in the hospital, unless it can be construed to be covered by
the agreement that he "does hereby agree and covenant that the good will
and practice of what is known as the Burdine Hospital is hereby conveyed
and transferred . . . and" he "hereby stipulates and covenants that he
will not establish or maintain a hospital. . . ." But should this stipulation
be so construed, it does not appear that the defendant received any consideration for the sale of the practice. The only property owned by the
defendant in the hospital was an operating table owned by him and his
brother which was included in the sale. Defendant's contract or covenant
not to compete is substantially one in gross which is generally considered
to compete are supported generally as ancillary to
invalid. Contracts not
2
some other contract. T
REFORMATION OF LEGAL INSTRUMENTS

Disputed Boundar.-Plaintiff claimed that after an agreement had
been made with him by the vendors, the east boundary staked out as conforming with the agreement and a deed executed, which did not conform
23. 206 Ga. 12, 55 S.E.2d 605 (1949).
24. Good summary. Jenkins, J., in Kutash v. Gluckman, 193 Ga. 805, 20 S.E.2d 128
(1942).
25. GA. CODE § 20-504 (1933).
26. See Griffin v. Vanderfriff, 205 Ga. 288, 53 S.E.2d 345 (1949).
27. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1636, 1637, 1648 (Rev. ed. 1937); 28 AM. JUR. 300,

§ 107.
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to such east boundary, that the vendors conveyed a portion of the land
lying within the land agreed to be conveyed to him to the other defendants.
Plaintiff alleged that he went into possession of the land and built a pasture fence on said east boundary. He claimed, first, that the staking out
of the eastboundary was the fixing of a disputed boundary; but, if this
was not available, that the deed be reformed to conform to the staked
out boundary. He further alleged that the other defendants as purchasers
of said tract had notice of his claim. The court affirmed the ruling of the
trial court in sustaining the defendants' demurrer. 8 Plaintiff cannot base
his case on an oral agreement as to the staking out of the east boundary
and possession accordingly taken, for when this was done there was no
disputed boundary and the oral agreement as to the east boundary was
merged in the deed. Consequently, the plaintiff must depend on reformation of the deed; and notice to the purchasers of the plaintiff's clam is not
involved, since notice must be coupled "with proof of a right, title, equity
claim, or interest in the land in controversy; and the difficulty the [plaintiff] faces in this case is proof of any equity or title whatever without
seeking a reformation of the deed." Nor is the petition sufficient for reformation as it does not allege any mutual mistake in its execution, nor
fraud on the part o c one party and mistake on the part of the other. As
to the court's conclusion with respect to disputed boundary there would
be little question, but the court's holding with respect to notice as not
including the right to reformation may be questioned. The court seems
to hold that the right to reformation is not sufficient equity as to render
a subsequent purchaser with notice subject to such right. In this respect,
the decision is not in conformity with the great weight of authority in
America. 2 Since the instant case could well have been decided on the failure
of the petition to state a cause of action for reformation for fraud or
mistake, the holding as to notice of the plaintiff's right to reformation may
be considered dictum.
Evidence of Mistake.-Although a court of equity will reform a description in a deed on the ground of mutual mistake, it will be granted
only "where the evidence is clear, unequivocal, and decisive as to the mistake." A survey based on statements of others as to lines and boundaries
is not sufficient. Where boundaries may be established "by proof of traditionary reputation in the neighborhood, derived from ancient sources or
from the declarations of persons since deceased who had peculiar means
of knowing the reputation as to the boundary of a tract of land in an
ancient day, present day reputation would not be admissible." Nor can the
verified petition have any effect as evidence since the grantor is deceased."
Effect of Laches.-Reformation of an instrument may be barred on
the ground of laches. Long delay resulting in obscuring the evidence or
a delay resulting in a change of conditions where the rights of third parties
28. Hicks v. Smith, 205 Ga. 614, 54 S.E.2d 407 (1949).
29. 45 AM. JUR. 626, § 70; Notes, 44 A.L.R. 82, 92; Notes, 102 A.L.R. 827, 830. Tncidentally, possession in sufficient notice of such equity. Note, 44 A.L.R. 100; Note,
102 A.L.R. 833. See also Graham v. Brand, 163 Ga. 356, 148 S.E. 84 (1929); GA.
CODE§

85-408 (1933).

80. Minor v. Fincher, 206 Ga. 721, 58 S.E.2d 389 (1950).
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are affected will defeat the equitable right to reformation.' Mutual mistake in a lease resulting from the advice of an attorney drawing the same,
in assuring the parties that the language used expressed their intent, could
not be reformed after the lessors had delayed for over three years and
after two assignments of the lease. On the issue of laches, the court
affirmed the judgment of. the trial court in sustaining a demurrer to the
petition. Since there was a demurrer to the petition, the court held that
the plaintiffs must show that their cause of action was not barred by laches,
the pleading being construed most strongly against them. 2
RESCISSION AND CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS

Effect of Negligence.-The question- of the right to rescind a contract
for mistake came up in Adler v. Adler Co.,33 where a partner sued to
have a contract for the dissolution of a partnership rescinded. The contract specifically provided that "the parties hereto do not desire to go
back and recast the accounts." Although the contract thus stipulated that
the plaintiff should assume the risk as to what an audit of the books might
show, the court preferred to go farther and base the decision on additional equitable principles. A party to a contract will not be relieved from
his obligation because of mistake of fact if by reasonable diligence he
could have had knowledge of the truh.4 And the recital in the contract
was sufficient to put the plaintiff on notice as to the possibility that the true
status of the credits and accounts was not as the books apparently showed. 5
It will be noticed that the mistake of fact referred to by the court is one
going to the formation of a contract. In such case diligence on the part
of the complaining party is required by the Georgia Law. Although the
general law is not clear, the doctrine of diligence is followed in many jurisdictions."0
Effect of Fraztd.-Where the plaintiff was induced to enter into a contract for the purchase of a one-half interest in a pressing business, upon a
false representation that the books would show a profitable business, but the
plaintiff purchased without inspecting the books which inspection would
have required a delay, and the plaintiff feared that another would purchase,
the court of equity refused to rescind the partnership agreement arising
from the contract. The court said, "It has often been said by this court
that equity just simply will not excuse negligence and grant relief from
injury which is the result of such negligence. We repeat that statement in
'
order to emphasize the firmness and inflexibility of the rule."37
3
As in .4dler v. /Idler ' the facts are those that go toward the formation
31. An excellent statement of the doctrine of laches was given by Bell, C.J., in Cooper
v. Aycock, 199 Ga. 658, 666, 34 S.E.2d 895, 900 (1945).
32. Parker v. Fisher, 207 Ga. 3, 59 S.E.2d 715 (1950).
33. 205 Ga. 818, 55 S.E.2d 139 (1949).
34. GA. CODE § 37-211 (1933).
35. GA. CODE § 37-116 (1933).
36. MCCLINTOCK, EQUITY § 246 (2d ed. 1948). This is to be distinguished from mutual
mistake of fact in reformation cases. McCLINTOCK, op. cit. supra § 246; CLARK,
EQUITY § 356 (1919). Classification of mistake of fact. CHAFEE AND SIMPLEON, CASES
ON EQUITY 1313 et seq. (1934).
37. Wild v. Krenke, 206 Ga. 83, 55 S.E.2d 544 (1949).
38. See note 33 sups-a.
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of a contract. So, either a mistake of fact or fraud going to the formation
of an agreement will not be sufficient ground to relieve the injured party
where he has failed to exercise due diligence. As to fraud, the law in other
jurisdictions is not generally in accord with the Georgia doctrine, although
certain courts have held that the negligence of the injured party is fatal."
Failure to Read the Instrument.-Where one signs an instrument without reading it, upon the false representation of the other party as to its
nature or contents, ordinarily the equity court will not grant relief to the
injured party. In Jackson v. Shaham ° the court restated the Georgia law
on this point. Here, the grantor brought suit after the death of the grantee
to have a deed set aside on the ground of fraud. It appeared in the evidence that the grantee had brought a paper to the plaintiff's home and
secured her signature to it upon the representation that the paper was a
renewal of a security deed when, in fact, it was a warranty deed. The court
sustained a non-suit granted by the trial court. The court held that one
who signs an instrument without reading it is chargeable with such lack
of diligence as to bar any relief because of the fraud. The only fraud that
will excuse such failure is such fraud as prevents the party from reading."
The doctrine of failure to read the instrument applies to those that derive
their validity from acceptance as well as signing. It applies to deeds but
not to insurance policies. 2 The Georgia law is apparently stricter on the
matter of failure to read an instrument than is the general law. 3
Return of Consideration.-Where suit is brought for cancellation of
a deed for fraud, fraud may be shown by any advantage that an agent
has secured for himself by the relationship. Proof of actual fraud is not
necessary. And, although the plaintiff generally must allege tender back
of the consideration received prior to the institution of the suit, this is not
necessary where the plaintiff either is entitled to keep what was received
or did not actually receive anything of value." But where the plaintiff
seeks to have a note cancelled, there being no confidential relationship
against the idorser who has paid the same on default of the plaintiff, the
plaintiff must allege that he has tendered payment or that such tender,
if made, would be refused. Otherwise, equity will not consider equitable
relief dependent upon cancellation. This is based on the principle that
"equity will not decree the cancellation of an instrument where anything
of value has been received until repayment is either made or tendered or
the defendant has stated that, should a tender be made, it would be refused." A petition that does not allege facts involving the above principle
is demurrable. The principle is based on Code Section 37-104, that "He
who would have equity must do equity." ' ' And, where an accounting be39. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1516, 1516A (Rev. ed. 1937).
40. 205 Ga. 411, 54 S.E.2d 138 (1949 .

41.

42.
43.
44.
45.

GA. CODE ANN. §§ 37-211, 212 (1946 Rev.), and the annotations under the catchword,
"Read Contract"; Livingston v. Barnett, 193 Ga. 640, 19 S.E.2d 385 (1942).
Wilson v. Bush, 22 Ga. App. 83, 95 S.E. 317 (1918) ; Grimsley v. Singletary, 133
Ga. 56, 65 S.E. 92 (1909).
23 AM. JUR. 982, 983, §§ 170, 171; 37 C.J.S. 279, § 34, n. 74.
Smith v.Merck, 206 Ga. 361, 57 S.E.2d 326 (1950).
Wilson v. McAteer, 206 Ga. 835, 59 S.E.2d 252 (1950). The same principle applies
to recission of contracts for fraud at law. GA. CODE § 20-906 (1933).
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tween the parties is likely to show that the plaintiff is entitled to retain
the amount received, tender is not necessary."
Where land is sold by tract with dimensions and it later appears that
another person has title to a portion of the land described, the purchaser
may either rescind the contract or seek reduction of the price according
to the relative value of the land sold. Nor in such case is it necessary to
attach an abstract of title as in a suit to recover land and mesne profits or
an action to enjoin the cutting of timber. However, the Supreme Court
reversed the judgment of the trial court on the ground that in the state
of the evidence the instruction for a verdict was improper.4"
REMOVING CLOUD FRoM TITLE

Necessity of Possession.-In Burton v. Hart4s the heirs attacked the
validity of a deed conveying certain property by a husband to his wife
and willed by her to her sister, the defendant. The prayers, among other
things, were for the cancellation of the deed and for vesting title in the
plaintiffs on the ground of fraud, undue influence and mental incapacity
of the grantor. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs' evidence, the trial judge
granted a non suit. On review, the judgment was reversed on the ground
that there was sufficient evidence to withstand a non suit. The defendant
in error contended that there was no evidence of fraud or undue influence
and, furthermore, that the plaintiffs could not maintain an equitable proceeding to remove a cloud from their alleged title since they were not in
possession. The court recognized the general rule that a plaintiff out of
possession can not remove a cloud from his title for the reason that he has
an adequate remedy at law in ejectment. However, the court pointed out
certain exceptions to the general rule, including instances ( i) "Where
there is a distinct head of equity jurisdiction sufficient to support the action,
as where deeds are obtained by fraud or other illegal means." This exception applies in case of "fraud or a prayer for a decree of title in the petitioner." In the instant case one of the prayers is "that title to the real
estate . . . be decreed to be vested in petitioners."4 Plaintiffs' case would
fall within this exception. However, (2) a further exception is found in
the allegation of grantors of mental incapacity. "Under such circumstances,
there exists a distinct head of equity jurisdiction sufficient to support the
action regardless of the question of fraud. See Boynton v Ruse, 112 Ga.
354, 37 S.E. 437-" The instant case contains a clearer statement of the
exceptions to the general rule than is usually found in the books."0
APPOINTMENT OF RECEIVER

Illeyality.-The jurisdiction of a court of equity will not be exercised
even in a type case which ordinarily falls therein where there is any illegal46. Dumas v. Dumas, 206 Ga. 767, 58 S.E.2d 830 (1950).
47. Norris v. Coffee, 206 Ga. 759, 58 S.E.2d 812 (1950). The instant case is based on
Code Section 29-202, covering failure of title to part of the land conveyed. Deficiency
as to quantity is governed by Code Section 29-201.
48. 206 Ga. 87, 55 S.E.2d 594 (1950).
49. See Oglesby v. Oglesby, 198 Ga. 864, 32 S.E.2d 906 (1945).
50. See 44 AM. JUR. 32, § 41; 12 C.J.S. 954, § 16 (b) ; 9 C.J. 1190, § 57, n. 50.
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ity or inequitable situation involved in the circumstances presented. In
Smith v. Nix" the executrix of a deceased partner brought suit for a receivership and an accounting of the proceeds and assets of a partnership
engaged in the liquor business. Defendant demurred on the ground that
the petition showed that the partnership as arranged and carried on was
illegal. The demurrer was sustained in the trial court and the judgment
affirmed by the Supreme Court with one dissent. It appeared that the conduct of the liquor business by the arrangement between the deceased, as
a silent partner, and the defendant, and also the use of the name of an
employee in securing a license and conducting the liquor business, did not
comply with the requirements of the state law. Consequently, the contract between the deceased and the defendant involved an illegal enterprise
and was void under Code Section 20-50i. The plaintiff was thus barred by
the "clean hands" doctrine.
Concurrent Jurisdiction with Law.-In Hamrick v. Hamrick52 the
plaintiff sought by suit in equity the appointment of a receiver. Among
other matters, the plaintiff, a legatee, specified certain assets and accounts
which he alleged were not included in the inventory and appraisement made
by the defendant executor to the court of ordinary. A general demurrer
was sustained and the petition dismissed. On review, the Supreme Court,
with one dissent, sustained the judgment. The question involved was the
jurisdiction of equity over the settlement of accounts in the administration
of decedents' estates. It was conceded that, by the established rule, where
two courts have concurrent jurisdiction the one first taking jurisdiction
will retain it; yet it was contended that since Code Section 1 3-2203 gives
the court of equity concurrent jurisdiction with the ordinary over the
settlement of accounts, such jurisdiction is thereby separated from the
regular administration, and that a suit in equity involving this alone is a
separate action from that made by the regular administration. Consequently, it was contended that the requirements of the Code," that before
a court of equity will interfere, there must be danger of loss, has no
application in a suit for settlement of accounts of administration. There is
a conflict in the decisions, admitted the court, but the older cases which
are controlling hold that there must be some danger of loss or mismanagement in the handling of the accounts not within the ordinary's control before equity can assume jurisdiction.
The Constitution vests the powers of .the court of ordinary and of
probate in the ordinary for each county, and neither the legislature nor
the judiciary can divest the ordinary of such powers. Furthermore, there
is no reason to question the validitv of the Code sections giving equity
concurrent jurisdiction with the ordinary, for, even so, equity will not
exercise iurisdiction where the legal remedy is adequate. And, though the
Code makes settlement of accounts concurrent, this does not give a court
of equity jurisdiction without a showing of the inadequacy of the remedies
at law. The court concluded that "despite the concurrent jurisdiction of
a court of equity, it will not assume jurisdiction for any purpose unless
51. 206 Ga. 403, 57 S.E.2d 275 (1950).
52.
53.

206 Ga. 564, 57 S.E.2d 145 (1950).
GA. CODE § 37-403 (1933).
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it be shown that the remedies available in the court of ordinary are inadequate to afford full and complete relief to the aggrieved interested
partis."
SUIT TO SET ASIDE A JUDGMENT

Fraud in Securing Judgment.-Where a widow has secured a judgment
in a court of ordinary through fraud, a court of equity has jurisdiction to
set such judgment aside. The fraud in the instant case consisted in a representation made by a widow, who was co-executrix with one of the plaintiffs, to a brother of the petitioners that she would treat the petitioners
fairly and would claim only her interest under the will and would not
claim her year's support. Petitioners lived in Greece. She further assured
the petitioners' brother that they would not need an attorney, and instructed him to so inform the petitioners. Acting upon these promises, the
petitioners did not employ counsel. Defendant, however, applied to the
court of ordinary for, and secured, an order setting aside certain valuable
property for her support. The petitioners prayed for the vacation of the
order for a year's support. The superior court overruled a general demurrer as to the prayer for the vacation of the order of the court of
ordinary. This part of the judgment of the superior court was affirmed by
the Supreme Court." A court of equity has jurisdiction to set aside a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction "for fraud, accident, or mistake
or the acts of the adverse party unmixed with the negligence or fault of
the petitioner. '5 5 Here, the fraud went to the procuring of the judgment,
for the defendant's promises had prevented the petitioners from taking
steps to care for their interest. Moreover, no negligence could be charged
to the petitioners in not keeping themselves informed as to the legal proceedings, since the position of an executrix is "a position of the highest
trust and confidence." The instant petition was not one which attempts a
collateral attack upon the judgment of the court of ordinary, but was a direct attack upon such judgment. And this may be done without the petitioners moving to vacate the judgment in the court of ordinary."
The same principles were applied in Hogg v. Hogg.57 The plaintiff, son
of the defendant, a widow, the father and husband having recently died,
sought to have an order of a court of ordinary for a year's support set
aside by a court of equity. The mother had assured the plaintiff that
neither his remainder in certaiin land, nor his distributative share in the
personalty as provided in his father's will, would be affected by the proceedings for a year's support. He did not understand the proceedings for a
year's support, and depended on his mother's assurance. The Supreme
Court affirmed the trial court's judgment in overruling a demurrer to the
plaintiff's petition. A court of equity has jurisdiction to vacate a judgment
procured by fraud; and here, the plaintiff was not chargeable with failure to
54. Johnson v. Bogdis, 205 Ga. 535, 54 S.E.2d 621 (1949).
55. See GA. CODE §§ 37-219, 110-710 (1933).
56. Fulmer v. Wilkens, 201 Ga. 322, 39 S.E.2d 405 (1946). Usually, however, equity
does not have jurisdiction to vacate a judgment where there is a legal remedy open
to have it modified or vacated. Cone v. Eubanks, 167 Ga. 384, 145 S.E. 652 (1928).
This is the majority rule. 49 C.J. 695, § 343; 31 AM. JUR. 245, § 681.
57. 206 Ga. 691, 58 S.E.2d 403 (1950).
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exercise deligence since the relationship between the plaintiff and defendant
was one of confidence.'
But where there was a period of eleven years elapsing between the time
that an executor had been discharged in a court of ordinary, the discharge
involving a note evidencing a debt he had owed the estate, which he alleged
he had paid but the deceased had failed to destroy, the court held that the
plaintiffs, heirs, had failed to exercise due diligence. Plaintiffs had notice
of the petition filed in the ordinary's court, and its contents, which was notice of the contention that the note had been paid. After the discharge of
the executor, the parties dealt at arms length."
ENJOINING ACTIONS AT LAW

Adequate Relief at Law.-Closely connected with vacating a judgment
is the jurisdiction to enjoin an action at law. Plaintiff, a sheriff, filed a
petition against a county commissioner and the executing officer, a county
coroner, to enjoin them from proceeding further with a possessory warrant for the possession of a radio installed in the plaintiff's automobile to
aid in the performance of the sheriff's duties. The radio had been purchased by one of the commissioners on the recommendation of the grand
jury. The trial court sustained a demurrer to the petition which judgment
was reversed on appeal.6" The court said that equity would not interfere
"where an adequate and complete remedy is provided by law, Code, Section 37-120," but in the case of a possessory warrant the executing officer
is authorized to take possession of the property and hold it until disposed
of under the proceedings provided."' So, under proceedings of possessory
warrant, the plaintiff would be deprived of the use of the radio and, although the other injuries, such as damage to the plaintiff's car in removing
the radio, could be compensated, the deprivation of its use, preventing him
from communicating with other peace officers and alerting them as to the
apprehending of criminals, could not be compensated. Consequently, equity
has jurisdiction to prevent the seizure and sale of the radio.
However, where a power company sought to enjoin the prosecution of
a pending action by a city to collect reasonable rent for certain street light
equipment, after expiration of a rental contract of the city's equipment to
the plaintiff, the court on review affirmed a judgment of the trial court
sustaining the city's demurrer to the power company's petition. 2 It was
held that any of the relief sought in the power company's petition, to which
it may be entitled, "can be and should be obtained by appropriate pleadings
in the case sought to be enjoined. The Uniform Procedure Act was intended to cover just such a situation as is here presented."
An adequate and complete remedy provided by law will defeat jurisdiction in equity. In the case of notice of intention to institute dispossesory
proceedings, the party claiming title to the property and denying tenancy
is not entitled to an injunction to stay such proceedings since the tenant
58. See Ellis v. Hogan, 147 Ga. 609 (3), 95 S.E. 4 (1918).
59. Cannon v. Fulton National Bank, 206 Ga. 609, 57 S.E.2d 917 (1950).
60. Davis, Sheriff v. Logan, 206 Ga. 524, 57 S.E.2d 568 (1950).
61. GA. CODE §§ 82-101 et seq. (1933).
62. Georvia Power Company v. Mayor, etc., of Athens, 206 Ga. 513, 57 S.E.2d 573
(1950).
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is afforded an adequate remey at law under the Code. 3 Even poverty of
the tenant is not sufficient in such a case to give equity jurisdiction. 4
ENJOINING CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS

Excessive License Fee.-In Chandler v. City of Tifton" a petition was
filed praying that the City of Tifton, its recorder and its chief of police
be restrained and enjoined from arresting or making cases against the
petitioner for the sale of wine, or from trying him in the police or
recorder's court, and that an ordinance of the city, assessing a specific
occupation tax of $5,ooo on retail dealers in wine be declared void and
unconstitutional. "It was contended that said ordinance was void as being
arbitrary, unreasonable, and confiscatory, and that the same violated the
due process clauses of the Federal and State constitutions."
After a hearing, the trial judge denied an interlocutory injunction. On
appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment. By legislation the sale
of wine at retail was made legal, unless the county had voted to prohibit
such sales; and, although a municipality has the power to require a license
fee or may revoke or refuse the granting of a license for cause, it cannot
arbitrarily and without cause prohibit the sale of wine at retail. From the
evidence it was apparent that the excessive license fee was imposed for tile
purpose either of preventing the petitioner from engaging in business or
making it easier to police one store than many, since no one else would be
able to pay the license fee and, further, that petitioner's store had constituted a nuisance.
The city contended that, since it had the power to revoke or withhold
a license for cause, it had the power to fix the amount of the fee for
reasons shown in the record that the petitioner's business had been operated as a nuisance and that it would be cheaper to police one store that
paid a higher fee than many that paid lower fees. The court said that this
contention would have merit if the issue were a refusal or revocation of a
license under the city's police power, but that, here, the issue involved was
the power of the city to raise revenue. The court found the excessive license
fee void because unreasonable. Consequently, "it becomes unnecessary for
us," said the court, "to deal with the attack made on the constitutionality of
the ordinance. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. City of Columbus, 189
Ga. 458, 473, 6 S.E. 2d 320."
As to the injunction, it was conceded by the court that generally a court
of equity will not enjoin a criminal prosecution, but there is an exception
where such prosecution illegally threatens irreparable injury or destruction
of property and the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at law. Here, several
criminal cases had been made against an employee of the petitioner under
a previous ordinance which improperly prohibited the sale of wine, forcing
the petitioner to institute proceedings by injunction to stop further prosecutions and, under the present ordinance, the city officials had notified the
petitioner and his employees that separate cases would be made against
them for each sale and, further, that the wine on hand must be moved
from the city and the store closed or this would be done for them. The
63.
64.
65.

Hall v. Johnson, 206 Ga. 843, 59 S.E.2d 382 (1950).
Flynn v. Merick, 204 Ga. 420, 49 S.E.2d 892 (1948).
206 Ga. 43, 55 S.E.2d 568 (1949).
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petitioner had on hand about $2,000 worth of wine. The case, said the
court, "falls within the ruling in Walker v. Mayor and Council of the City
of Carrollton, 187 Ga. 237, 200 S. E. 268." The facts in the instant case,
"showing that the plaintiff's employee had been arrested many times, and
that the officers of the municipality charged with enforcement of the law
had threatened to seize the plaintiff's property and close his place of business, were sufficient to authorize a court of equity to intervene."
On the other hand, in a case"6 where the petitioner alleged that a license
tax was illegal as in excess of that permitted by state law to be imposed
on owners and operators of music machines operated by inserting coins
therein, the only threat alleged to the owner was that the city, after refusing the legal amount tendered, had "through its chief of police . . .
issued a summons to him to appear in police court to answer the charge
of doing business without a license." And, further, that the chief of police
had directed the petitioner to disconnect the machines from the electric
circuits and cease operations. The court reversed a judgment of the trial
court overruling a demurrer to the petition. Mere inconvenience, expense
or apprehension of injury to property rights will not bring a case within
the exception. Nor will mere general allegations of irreparable injury in
the deprivation of property rights be sufficient. Here, the petitioner alleged
only a summons to appear in the police court, and that the police chief
had directed him to disconnect the machines from the electrical circuit.
The:e were no allegations that the petitioner's property had been seized.
In cases falling within the exception, "there were specific allegations of
injury or damage to property or interference by arrest of the plaintiff's
employees."
It is difficult to distinguish the Cooper case from the Chandler case
except on the basis of degree. The summons in the Cooper case could well
interfere with the freedom of the person, and the disconnecting of the
machines render the property useless in the city and deprive the petitioner
of the pursuit of a legitimate business. In view of the holding in the two
cases, the could would require, to withstand a demurrer, allegations in
the petition stating with definiteness and certainty a threatened direct injury to property, or interference with the freedom of the person by
arrest which would clearly result in the destruction of a legitimate business.
Unreasonable Interference zcith Legitimate Businss.-An outstanding

case involving the jurisdiction of a court of equity to enjoin a criminal
7 Petitioner, in
prosecution is Mloultrie Milk Shed, Inc. v. City of Cairo."
seking an injunction, alleged that the City of Cairo adopted an ordinance
which prohibited the sale of milk within the city limits unless it had been
pasteurized in a plant located in Grady County, which is the county in
which the City of Cairo is located. The city had, after a hearing, cancelled
the petitioner's license to sell milk in Cairo, and had made one criminal
case against the petitioner's agent and, although petitioner was prosecuting a review by certiorari and had procured a supersedeas, other prosecutions were threatened. Further, it was alleged that the petitioner could
not secure employees in Cairo because of such threatened prosecutions and,
City of Tifton v. Cooper, 206 Ga. 379, 57 S.E.2d 196 (1950).
67. 206 Ga. 348, 57 S.E.2d 199 (1950).
66.
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as a result of the city's proceedings, the petitioner was threatened with
the entire loss of its business within the city.
The main contention was that the ordinance was void "because it was
arbitrary, discriminatory, unreasonable, and offended the equal protection
clauses of the State and Federal constitutions." It was alleged "that petitioner's plant and milk are regularly and properly inspected by competent
inspectors nd laboratory tests are made by State officials from samples
taken by the inspectors and sent to the State laboratory; and that the inspection of all milk in the State is by the above process." Upon the interlocutory hearing, the material facts alleged above appeared, and at the
conclusion of the hearing, the presiding judge considered the ordinance
void, but refused an interlocutory injunction on the ground that the question of the validity of the ordinance would be determined under the writ
of certiorari. The exception was to that judgment.
As to the contention of the defendants that equity will not interfere
with the administration of criminal law, the court cited two recent cases
and said that in those cases "we undertook to put at rest all uncertainty
as to the circumstances under which equity would enjoin a criminal prosecution. It was there pointed out that an exception to the general rule is
when injury to property is threatened, and when this is true, injunction
will lie notwithstanding the fact that in the process a criminal prosecution
is enjoined. The facts in the present case bring it within that exception.
It is alleged and admitted that the defendants threatened prosecution of
all employees and agents of the petitioner for each and every sale or
delivery of. milk made within the city. There was also an allegation that,
because of this expressed intention, the petitioner is unable to secure the
necessary employees for the operation of its businss. A plainer case of
injury to property could hardly be shown."
As to the contention that under the evidence the judge was authorized
to find that no profits were being realized in the city, the court said: "The
threats of destruction of the petitioner's entire business render inapplicable
the rule requiring proof of loss of profits

.

.

. Hence, we are not primarily

concerned here with the size of the petitioner's profits, but we are concerned with the right of the petitioner to freely engage in a lawful business
irrespective of profits."
As to the contention that the certiorari was the sole available remedy,
the court said that this is sound with respect to matters embraced in cases
reviewed by certiorari, but wifh respect to "injuries subsequent thereto
resulting from acts or threatened acts of the defendants, the petitioner is
entitled to relief in equity ... *." "We hold," said the court, "that a proper

case for equitable relief is shown, provided it be held that the ordinance
in question is void."
Taking up the question of the validity of the ordinance, the court took
the view that although the city may protect the public health by preventing the sale of contaminated food, yet one engaged in a lawful business
cannot be arbitrarily prevented from carrying on the same when he is
injuring no one. "If free enterprise," said the court, "is to mean more
than mere words, it must not become the victim of arbitrary and discriminatory legislation. We have presented above a brief glimpse of the tremen-
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dous importance of the question this court is called upon to decide. Where
the line marking the limit to which legislation to protect the public health
may encroach upon freedom of competition and legitimate business be
drawn? Our decision, here, will constitute a precedent, a yardstick by
which future similar questions must be decided. If this city is held by
this court to be justified in restricting the trade in milk as is here done, it
would constitute a precedent requiring a holding by this court tomorrow
that all other cities could lawfully, upon the theory of protecting the public
health, exclude foods such as syrup and pickles produced in Cairo from
the markets in other cities unless they were processed in a plant situated
within the county in which such cities are located. The most destructive
enemy to free enterprise and individual liberty comes dressed in attractive garments, and is covered with a sugar coating in order that the victim
will accept it unaware of its future destruction of his own freedom." Cases
from other jurisdictions were cited and the Georgia case involving ice
cream 8 distinguished. Here, "the fact that the pasturizing plant of the
petitioner is located outside of Grady County has no reasonable relation
to the matter of protecting the public health which would justify a classification of the petitioner differently from that given another whose pasteurizing'plant is located in Grady County. No valid basis for a different
classification and discrimination between them as made by the ordinance
exists, and there is a denial of equal protection which is guaranteed by both
the State and Federal Constitution."
INJUNCTION AGAINST TORTS

Private Nuisances.-In Cairo Pickle Co. v. Muggridge0 several riparian
owners on a creek sought a temporary and final injunction against the
defendant, a pickle company, from discharging the waste water from its
plant into the creek upon which they were lower riparian owners. During
dry times there was an offensive odor and the fish in the creek were killed;
and, during such times, the cattle and hogs of some of the plaintiffs would
not drink the water in the creek. Under an agreement, the defendant undertook to secure land for a disposal pond during dry weather and, if it could
not purchase the land for such purpose, a condemnation proceeding would
be instituted. Such condemnation proceedings by the city became necessary,
but until the matter was determined the trial court issued a temporary
injunction, which judgment was affirmed on review. Riparian owners are
entitled to have the stream flow to them unadulterated to such an extent as
not to interfere with their enjoyment of it. As to joint suit by the riparian
owners, it was held that such owners "have such a community of interest
that they may join in a petition to restrain an upper proprietor or stranger
from adulterating the water." Adulteration includes injury to the fishing
privilege or rendering the land less valuable for pasture purposes. As to
the jurisdiction of the trial court, large discretion is vested in the chan68. Wright v. Richmond County Dept. of Health, 182 Ga. 651, 186 S.E. 815 (1936).
69. 206 Ga. 80, 55 S.E.2d 562 (1949).
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cellor in granting injunctions and the court on review will not interfere
with his discretion unless clearly abused."0
Trespass to Property.-In Gardner v. Mayor and Council of Athens"'
the court applied the doctrine of balancing of conveniences, in that it
took into consideration "whether greater harm might be done by refusing
than by granting the injunction." The trial judge had refused an interlocutory injunction, which judgment was reversed. Plaintiffs, owner of
land and a flying corporation, sought to enjoin a city and its officers from
grading a city street claimed by the city. On appeal, the court found that
the evidence did not show any of the three methods in which a street
might be acquired, as by legal proceedings, by dedication or by prescription. Consequently, it was held that the city had no right to grade the
claimed street; and that, since the defendants had not made any improvements on the way claimed, but the plaintiffs would be greatly injured by
the proposed grading, the interlocutory injunction should have been issued.
Delay and Estoppel.-lt appeared in I/ipkey v. Turner7 " that the defendant had substantially completed a building designed to be used as a
drug store. The city had adopted a zoning ordinance proviing that in the
area in which the drug store was being completed "only residences, apartments, and churches may be erected," but after a petition of many residents in the area, the city rezoned the lot on which the defendant erected
the drug store. The proceedings covered a period of several months and
the plaintiffs were fully aware of the hearings, the rezoning and the
erection of the drug store. The city had not adopted the provisions of
the act of 1946 which would have permitted "amendment, revocation,
alteration, and recession of zoning ordinances." Consequently, the drug
store was erected in an area in which such buildings were prohibited. After
the conclusion of the evidence which showed the above facts, the trial
judge granted a temporary injunction prohibiting the erection of a building to be used as a drug store. On review, this judgment was reversed.
Plaintiffs knew that the building was being erected, but they stood by and
permitted the expenditure of large sums of money before bringing their
petition for an injunction. Under the circumstances, they were'estopped,
and it is not material whether the term "estoppel" was used if the facts
show the application of that doctrine. Had the plaintiffs brought their
petition in due time, or if it had appeared that they did not have notice
of the rezoning and erection of the building, the doctrine of estoppel would
not have applied.
ENFORCEMENT OF EQUITABLE DECREES

Contempt Proceedings.-In a proper ease where a court of equity has
'commanded the defendant either to perform a certain act or to refrain
70. As to the general law, the best classification of private nuisances is found in
WALSH, EQUITY 170-196 (1930). His classification of private nuisances is (1) interference with easements and (2) interference with a neighbor's reasonable light of
enjoyment. The latter includes that class of cases which a violation of the maxim,
sic utere tuo alienum non lacdas. Illustrations of class (2) are the pollution of the
air and the creation of noises, vibrations or concussions. The above Georgia case
falls within class (1). Since, in nuisance cases, the injury is considered wilful, the
balancing of equities is usually not applied.
71. 206 Ga. 815, 58 S.E.2d 844 (1950).
72. 206 Ga. 410, 57 S.E.2d 481 (1950).
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therefrom, the court has the power to enforce such command by contempt
proceedings. It is often difficult to determine in such cases whether the
contempt proceedings are civil or criminal; and, although the distinction
is quite vital, the authorities that attempt to draw the line of demarcation
are in considerable confusion.
The Supreme Court of Georgia was recently presented with this difficult

problem in several cases involving a labor dispute. 7" The Celanese Corporation o, America had obtained a temporary restraining order against mass
picketing by its employees. Subsequently, the plaintiff corporation filed a
petition alleging the order had been violated by several named defendants
and prayed that citation be issued requiring the defendants to show
cause why the), "should not be adjudged in contempt of the orders and
processes of this court and be punished accordingly." They were found
guilty, as alleged within the petition for citation, each fined $200 payable
to the officer of the court, and confined in jail for 2o days.
Error was assigned on denial to stay such contempt judgment, on the
alleged ground that the basic controversy was thereafter settled by agreement between the parties, the defendant saying that they were found guilty
of civil contempt. The Supreme Court of Georgia cited and approved the
celebrated case of Gompers v. Buck Stozc & Range Co.,- in saying that

the distinction is based on the character and purpose of the suit, that if
remedial it is civil contempt, but if punitive then it is criminal, and that
the purpose of this citation was to punish the defendants, thus it was
criminal contempt which cannot be settled by the original parties.
The court overruled IJagncr '. Commercial Printers,7 5 which was
based on the same distinction, but held on similar facts that such a suit
was for civil contempt. The court then went on to say that this judgment
was not to enforce any affirmative right, but to punish for doing an act
forbidden by a restraining order; that the punishment having been meted
only as provided in Code Section 24-261

5

(5), such contempt was a mat-

ter affecting the public interest and thus quasi-criminal in nature. As to
the question of the original plaintiff bringing the contempt proceeding,
the court said that no particular form of procedure is necessary or required, and that it has long been recognized in this state as a proper method
of procedure for the original plaintiff to file the petition where the alleged
contempt -arose in violation of an injunction and was criminal or quasicriminal in nature. The court then stated that there are instances in Georgia where proceedings for criminal contempt were instituted by solicitorsgeneral.

The court, having decided that such a proceeding was for criminal con-

tempt, then took up in another case71 the question as to the burden of proof.

While admitting that the great weight of authority in a suit for criminal
contempt is that the evidence to find a person guilty must be beyond a
reasonable doubt, the court held that Code Section 38-IIo, which re-

quires the reasonable doubt rule in criminal cases, is to be applied only
Alred v. Celanese Corporation of America, Pedigo v. Celanese Corporation of America, Womack v. Celanese Corporation of America, 205 Ga. 371, 54 S.E.2d 240 (1949).
74. 221 U.S. 418, 31 S.Ct. 492, 55 L. Ed. 797 (1911).
75. 203 Ga. 1, 45 S.E.2d 205 (1947).
76. Pedigo v. Celanese Corporation of America, 205 Ga. 392, 54 S.E.2d 252 (1949).
73.
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to crimes defined in Code Section 26-201 and does not apply to a proceeding for criminal contempt; that the punishment for such contempt under
Code Section 24-26i5(5) is only a small fraction of the maximum punishment for a misdemeanor," which is the lightest offense listed as a crime
in Code Section 26-201 ; and that civil contempt may bring on more serious
punishment than criminal, yet, in the former, the preponderance-of-evidence rule-applies. Therefore, the preponderance-of-evidence rule applies
to a suit for criminal contempt in Georgia. The Supreme Court of the
United States denied certiorari in these cases, with Mr. Justice Black
saying he thought the petitioner was denied due process of law." In applying this-rule, the question of contempt in violation of an injunctive
order is within the discretion of the court that issued the order and, if
there is substantial evidence to uphold such contempt, the chancellor's
finding to that effect cannot be disturbed as to the sufficiency of the evidence. The appellate court will interfere only where the chancellor has
abused his discretion."
It would seem that the four distinctions set out in the Gompers case
exist in Georgia today, that is, the purpose of punishment, imprisonment,
fines and settling the case by the original parties; but it is immaterial in
a suit for criminal contempt whether the solicitor-general or the original
plaintiff brings the proceeding, and the rule of preponderance-of-evidence
will be applied in both civil and criminal contempt proceedings.
RESTITUTION

Equitable Principles.-A large area of former equitable jurisdiction
has been assumed by the law court. Although the form and the procedure
of recovery in such cases are legal, the principles applied are equitable.
The cases are grouped under the head of unjust enrichment. An illustration of this type of case is found in Brackett v. Fulton National Bank,"0
in which the court held that a bank was entitled to recover the amount of
overdraft of a depositor, the bank having made an error as to the amount
on deposit. In sustaining the trial court's judgment in overruling a demurrer to the bank's petition, the court, quoting from Jasper School District
v. Gromnley,8 ' said, "An action for money had and received is founded
upon the equitable principle that no one ought unjustly to enrich himself
at the expense of another, and is maintainable in all cases where one has
received money under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience
he ought not to retain it, and ex aequo et bono it belongs to another."
Following the general rule in America, the court concluded that "a bank
paying an overdraft for a depositor may maintain an action therefor
against him in indebitatus assumpsit."
77.
78.

See GA. CODE § 27-2506 (1933).

Pedigo v. Celanese Corporation of America, 338 U.S. 937, 70 S.Ct. 346, 94 L. Ed.
258 (1950); Aired v. Celanese Corporation of America, Womack v. Celanese Corporation of America, 338 U.S. 937, 70 S.Ct. 345, 94 L. Ed. 258 (1950).
79. Carroll v. Celanese Corporation of America, 205 Ga. 493, 54 S.E.2d 221 (1949);
Alred v. Celanese Corporation of America, 205 Ga. 499, 54 S.E.2d 225 (1949)
Womack v. Celanese Corporation of America, 205 Ga. 514, 54 S.E.2d 235 (1949);
Pedigo v. Celanese Corporation of America, 205 Ga. 392, 54 S.E.2d 252 (1949).
80. 80 Ga. App. 467, 56 S.E.2d 486 (1949).
81. 184 Ga. 756, 193 S.E. 248 (1937).
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Effect of Negligence.-It is frequently said that equity will not reform
or rescind a contract if the petitioner has been guilty of negligence, or at
any rate of gross negligence. This principle was applied to an action for
restitution.82 After the death of a partner, the surviving partner purchased
the deceased's interest in the partnership which amounted to sixty per cent.
of the business. This was done without any accounting. After the purchase,
It was discovered that through error in keeping the books the plaintiff was
not credited with his share of profits. He brought an action against the
administrator setting forth the errors in keeping the books, and prayed
for a judgment for the amount due him. The trial court sustained a demurrer and dismissed the petition. This judgment was affirmed on appeal.
The court said that there was no allegation that the purchase was effected
"because of misrepresentation, fraud, or deceit, nor is there any prayer for
rescission or reformation of the contract of purchase and sale of the deceased partner's interest. At best, it appears that the plaintiff has attempted
to plant his action upon the theory of money had and received by the estate
and heirs of the deceased which in equity and good conscience belongs to
the plaintiff."
This action is based on equitable principles, and "if the plaintiff is to
recover at all he must do so by showing that as a result of the mistakes in
the books he was misled into paying too high a price to the estate and
heirs of the deceased partner for that partner's interest, or that he would
not have purchased at so high a price had he been aware of the mistakes
in the books ...As we have said the action for money had and received

is a legal one in which equitable principles are applied. Equity will relieve
for mistakes of fact but equity does not relieve for ignorance, where the
party complaining could have had knowledge of the truth by reasonable
diligence." The slightest examination by the plaintiff of the books would
have revealed the situation. "If he chose to guess at the true value of the
deceased partner's interest, or rely upon the books without examination, and
got less than the true value by virtue of the mistake in the books, he cannot
now complain."
Since the doctrine of restitution comes from equity, it would be reasonable to apply the diligence requirement thereto. In as much as the instant
case came up on demurrer, it may well be supported on one of the grounds
suggested by the court that the plaintiff failed to allege sufficiently his mistake in making the purchase. Assuming, however, mistake and no showing
of change of position, the general law is that negligence will not bar recovery even in those jurisdictions which require diligence for equitable relief. "In contrast to the decisions in equity, it should be observed that, in
many cases in an action at law to recover money paid under a mistake of
fact, negligence of the plaintiff is held no bar to recovery unless there has
been such a change of position as to make recovery inequitable. But in
these cases there had been a failure of consideration for the money paid,
which often does not find perfect analogy where an attempt is made in
equity to rescind an executory contract or a conveyance.""
82. Davis v. Holloway, 81 Ga. App. 158, 58 S.E.2d 234 (1950).
83. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1596 (Rev. ed. 1937) ; 40 AM. JuR. 848-849, §§ 194-197;
RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION § 59 (1936); WOODWARD, THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS § 15 (1913).

